Exponential Structure of Income Inequality: Evidence from 67 Countries by Tao, Yong et al.
1	
	
Exponential Structure of Income Inequality: Evidence from 67 Countries 
 
Abstract: Economic competition between humans leads to income inequality, but, so far, there 
has been little understanding of underlying quantitative mechanisms governing such a collective 
behavior. We analyze datasets of household income from 67 countries, ranging from Europe to 
Latin America, North America and Asia. For all of the countries, we find a surprisingly uniform 
rule: Income distribution for the great majority of populations (low and middle income classes) 
follows an exponential law. To explain this empirical observation, we propose a theoretical 
model within the standard framework of modern economics and show that free competition and 
Rawls’ fairness are the underlying mechanisms producing the exponential pattern. The free 
parameters of the exponential distribution in our model have an explicit economic interpretation 
and direct relevance to policy measures intended to alleviate income inequality. 
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1. Introduction  
Economic inequality is a universal phenomenon in human societies. Although there are broad 
patterns of economic inequality between countries, their sources are poorly understood and hotly 
debated (Kuznets 1955; Acemoglu and Robinson 2009; Autor 2014; Piketty and Saez 2014; 
Ravallion 2014; Nishi et al. 2015). To explain the origin of economic inequality, researchers put 
forward different mechanisms, such as institutional structures (Acemoglu and Robinson 2009; 
Piketty and Saez 2014), technological progress (Acemoglu and Robinson 2009; Autor 2014), 
economic growth (Ravallion 2014), psychological factor (Nishi et al. 2015), and so on. In fact, 
because economic inequality involves many different aspects (e.g. income, wealth, social status, 
and so on) in human societies, seeking a universal pattern of economic inequality seems an 
impossible task. Nevertheless, some researchers tried to find universal patterns in income 
inequality. An influential economist Vilfredo Pareto proposed that income distribution in a 
society is well described by a power law (Pareto 1897). Although many studies have confirmed 
that the high-income class of populations follows a power law (Mandelbrot 1960; Kakwani 
1980), there is increasing evidence showing that it does not apply to the majority of population 
with lower income. Using income data for USA, Yakovenko and Rosser (2009) have shown that 
the US society has a well-defined two-class structure (Dragulescu and Yakovenko 2001a, 2001b; 
Silva and Yakovenko 2005; Yakovenko and Rosser 2009; Banerjee and Yakovenko 2010): The 
great majority of population (low and middle income class) follows an exponential law, while 
the remaining part (high income class) follows a power law. Dragulescu and Yakovenko 
proposed a thermal equilibrium theory based on statistical mechanics to explain the exponential 
pattern of income distribution (Dragulescu and Yakovenko 2000), which has won more and more 
support from recent empirical studies (Nirei and Souma 2007; Derzsy, Néda, and Santos 2012; 
Jagielski and Kutner 2013; Shaikh, Papanikolaou, and Wiener 2014; Shaikh 2016; Oancea, 
Andrei, and Pirjol 2016). However, it should be noted that the exponential law does not fit the 
super-low income data, which are usually fitted by log-normal or gamma distributions (Banerjee, 
Yakovenko, and Di Matteo 2006; Chakrabarti et al. 2013). Moreover, although the exponential 
law is quite successful in describing the low and middle income data, the mechanism of thermal 
equilibrium is questioned by mainstream economists (Cho 2014). These economists argue that 
the thermal theory of income distribution lacks solid economic foundation (Cho 2014), and so is 
unhelpful in making	policy recommendations. In response to this criticism, we show in this paper 
that the exponential law of income distribution can be derived from the principles of free 
competition and Rawls’ fairness (Rawls 1999), thus giving it a solid economic foundation (Tao 
2015, 2016). Because we introduce a rigorous economic treatment, the scope of applicability of 
the exponential distribution is determined, and we can explain why it fails to fit super-low and 
high income data. 
Furthermore, our results can be formulated as a powerful complement for the existing 
literatures. Understanding of the social impact and quantitative characterization of income 
inequality is a subject of great social and political importance. For the quantitative 
characterization of inequality, while there are plenty of case-by-case studies (Piketty and Saez 
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2003; Piketty 2003; Banerjee, Yakovenko, and Di Matteo 2006; Piketty and Qian 2009; 
Clementi, Gallegati, and Kaniadakis 2010, 2012; Jagielski and Kutner 2013; Shaikh, 
Papanikolaou, and Wiener 2014; Saez and Zucman 2016; Oancea, Andrei, and Pirjol 2016), most 
of them do not recognize the underlying universal quantitative structure of income inequality, i.e., 
do not see the forest for the trees. Here we present overwhelming empirical evidence, derived 
from the datasets for 67 countries, that the	low and middle part of income distribution follows a 
universal exponential law. More importantly, relative to other existing distributions, the fitting 
parameters in our distribution have an explicit economic interpretation and direct relevance to 
policy measures intended to alleviate income inequality. For the social impact of inequality, 
there are two strands of literatures. One line focuses on how the market structure and institution 
influences income inequality (Katz and Autor 1999; Autor, Katz, and Kearney 2008; Heathcote, 
Storesletten, and Violante 2010; Moretti 2013). The other line investigates the mechanism of 
redistribution reducing income inequality (Piketty and Saez 2003; Piketty 2003; Atkinson, 
Piketty, and Saez 2011; Golosov, Maziero, and Menzio 2013; Jones 2015). In this paper, we 
make an attempt to combine these two lines. On one side of the empirical investigation, we show 
that free economy exhibits a universal two-class structure: The great majority of population (low 
and middle income class) follows an exponential law, while the remaining part (high income 
class) follows a power law. On the other side of theoretical research, we show that the 
exponential income structure is a result of combining free competition and Rawls’ fairness, while 
the power income structure is due to the rule “the rich get richer” (i.e. the Matthew effect). To 
reduce the degree of inequality, we propose that the redistribution policy should be based on the 
principle of levying a tax on high-income class to pay the unemployment compensation, in line 
with Piketty’s policy propositions. 
2. Exponential income distribution 
In fact, mathematical apparatus of modern economics has been strongly influenced by 
physics. Following Newton’s paradigm of classical mechanics, the famous economist Leon 
Walras developed a set of equations that describe economic equilibrium (Walras 2003). These 
equations opened the paradigm of “neoclassical economics” and later were perfected by Kenneth 
J. Arrow and Gerard Debreu (Arrow and Debreu, 1954). Now these equations are called the 
“Arrow-Debreu’s general equilibrium model” (ADGEM), which is the well-known standard 
model of modern economics (Mas-Collel, Whinston, and Green 1995). Using such a model, one 
can illustrate why the equilibrium allocation of social resources, in which every social member 
obtains maximum satisfaction, exists in an “ideal institutional environment” that ensures 
reasonable private property rights and judicial justice.	 Following a mainstream economic 
approach, we use ADGEM in this paper to study the equilibrium income allocation among social 
members. Thus, we can observe that how macro-level pattern of income inequality arises from 
micro-level competitive interactions of individuals embedded within an ideal institutional 
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environment1. 
Without loss of generality, we consider an “𝑁-person non-cooperative game”, where are 𝑁 
consumers (or agents), each of whom operates a firm, so there are 𝑁 firms. Following the basic 
assumptions of neoclassical economics, each consumer should be selfish and have infinite desire; 
therefore, all of these firms will pursue maximum profit, and all of these consumers will 
exchange with each other to obtain maximum satisfaction. Furthermore, if a consumer is 
employed in a firm that he does not operate, he will obtain the ownership share of that firm. 
Because consumer 𝑖 operates firm 𝑖, his income consists of the firm’s operational revenue and 
the returns on holding the shares from other firms, where 𝑖 = 1,2,… ,𝑁. All of these settings are 
explained in detail in	Appendix A. In accordance with the basic settings of ADGEM, all the 
firms should be sufficiently competitive so that monopoly cannot arise; therefore, by the rule of 
gaining income above, each firm actually looks like a self-employed household or a small trader. 
This means that we can use household income data to test validity of our upcoming model. As 
the Pareto optimal solution to ADGEM that captures all of these settings above, Tao proved that 
(Tao 2015, 2016), in the long-run competition, each consumer’s equilibrium income should be 
completely random, and obeys the following constraint: 𝐼! ≥ 0   𝑓𝑜𝑟   𝑖 = 1,2,… ,𝑁𝐼!!!!! = 𝑌    (1) 
where 𝐼!  denotes the equilibrium income of the 𝑖th consumer and 𝑌 denotes GDP (Gross 
Domestic Product). 
Here we use 𝐴 = 𝐼!, 𝐼!,… , 𝐼!  to specify an “equilibrium income allocation” (EIA) among 𝑁 consumers. Due to the randomness of Pareto optimal solution (1), there is a large number of 
EIAs. To eliminate uncertainty of optimal allocations, the	proposal of traditional economists is to 
seek the best one by using a social preference function (Mas-Collel, Whinston, and Green 1995). 
Unfortunately, Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem has denied the existence of social preference 
(Arrow 1963). This is the well-known “dilemma of social choice”. However, Tao proposes that 
such a dilemma can be avoided by using the paradigm of natural selection (Tao 2016). To be 
specific, regarding each EIA as a random event and income distribution as a set of EIAs, we 
make a conjecture that, among all possible income distributions, the one endowed with the 
largest probability, i.e. the likeliest, ought to be selected, so it is survival of the likeliest 
(Whitfield 2007; Harte et al. 2008; Tao 2010, 2016). If our conjecture is right, we should expect 
the household income data to exhibit such an income distribution. 
The focus of this paper is on income distribution in a democratic economy. To find the 
probability of each income distribution occurring under the democratic environment, we apply 
Rawls’ justice principle of fair equality of opportunity (Rawls 1999) to ADGEM. Since ADGEM 
is an ideally just procedure, fair equality of opportunity indicates that each EIA should occur 
with an equal probability (Tao 2016). Rawls’ fairness in a democratic economy means that the 
door of opportunity is open to all social members (Rawls 1999). Rawls’ fairness principle is 
illustrated for an example of “2-person allocation” in Appendix B. When Rawls’ fairness 
																																								 																				 	
1 The emergence of income inequality can be traced back to the pioneering work of John Angle (Angle 1986, 
1992, 1993, 1996, and 2006). 
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principle is applied to “𝑁-person allocation” subject to constraints (1) where 𝑁 and 𝑌 are large 
enough, we find that the exponential income distribution occurs with the highest probability 
(detailed derivation is given in Appendix C): 𝑓 𝑥 = !! 𝑒! !!!!𝑥 ≥ 𝜇                                                        (2) 
or equivalently 𝑃 𝑡 ≥ 𝑥 = 𝑒! !!!!𝑥 ≥ 𝜇 .   (3) 
Here 𝑥 denotes income level, 𝑓 𝑥  is the probability density of income 𝑥, and 𝑃 𝑡 ≥ 𝑥  is 
the cumulative probability distribution, i.e. the fraction of population with the income higher 
than 𝑥. 
   The free parameters 𝜇 and 𝜃 denote marginal labor-capital return and marginal technology 
return (Tao 2010, 2016), respectively (see Appendix D). The constraint 𝑥 ≥ 𝜇 is considered as 
the Rational Agent Hypothesis (Tao 2010) in neoclassical economics, which states that firms (or 
agents) enter the market if and only if they can gain the marginal labor-capital return at least to 
pay for the cost; otherwise they will make a loss. Such a hypothesis explains why the exponential 
distribution fails to fit the super-low income data at 𝑥 lower than 𝜇. This is one limitation to 
applicability of the exponential income distribution (2). On the other hand, by the settings of 
ADGEM, each firm is sufficiently competitive, and hence looks like a self-employed household; 
therefore, the exponential income distribution (2) does not fit super-rich people (high income 
class) who should operate large firms (or monopolistic firms2). Thus, income distribution of 
super-rich people obeys a power law (Axtell 2001) due to the rule “the rich get richer” (Tao 2015) 
(i.e. the Matthew effect) rather than Rawls’	 equal opportunities. Consequently, when we fit 
income data using the exponential distribution (2), we should drop super-low and high income 
data. Finally, we point out that other scholars (Foley 1994; Chakrabarti and Chakrabarti 2009; 
Venkatasubramanian, Luo, and Sethuraman 2015) have also applied the concepts of Rawls’ 
fairness, utility and maximum entropy to derive income distribution; however, our derivation has 
the advantage of being based on ADGEM and specifying the range of applicability of the 
theoretical distribution.    
3. Empirical test for 67 countries 
We can estimate the values of 𝜇 and 𝜃 by fitting empirical income data to the cumulative 
probability distribution given in equation (3). The datasets employed in this paper come from 
many sources at the country level and consist of income data for a large sample of percentiles. 
Using data for a wide span of years, we obtain a dataset of 67 countries around the world, 
																																								 																				 	
2 In the neoclassical economics, monopolistic power implies that the behaviors among firms are highly 
heterogeneous. Interestingly, Lux and Marchesi (1999) also showed that heterogeneous behaviors among 
economic agents may lead to a power law in financial markets. 
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especially European and Latin American countries. The sources of data are fully described in the 
Appendix F. Because our model is based on the ADGEM, which describes an ideal market 
economy, we expect the exponential distribution to be applicable for the well-developed market 
economies. To this end, we primarily focus on OECD countries, for which it is also easier to find 
detailed and reliable income distribution data. Outside OECD, it is often difficult to get 
detailed-enough, reliable data in the appropriate format. So, the 67 countries analyzed in this 
paper are those for which we managed to find the data from the sources listed in Appendix F. 
Further effort would be desirable to expand the list of countries in future work. From the 
household income data, which is classified into macro income quantile data, obtained for each 
country, we compute the cumulative distribution of income 𝑃 𝑡 ≥ 𝑥 , which is the ratio of the 
number of social members whose income is larger than 𝑥 to the total population.  
Following our theoretical construction, the empirical analysis is conducted in two steps. First, 
we take logs to the values of the cumulative distribution equation and run a step-by-step ordinary 
least square (OLS) regression to the sample. Since we investigate the relationship between 
cumulative distribution of income and income level, according to the scope of applicability of 
exponential income distribution, we need to drop the high-income samples, as they follow a 
power law (Axtell 2001; Tao 2015). Resorting to the goodness of fit criteria, we select the 
samples based on the largest adjusted 𝑅! values criteria. To be specific, we first take logs to 
equation (3), 𝑙𝑛 𝑃 𝑡 ≥ 𝑥 = 𝑦 = 𝛽𝑥 + 𝛼 + 𝜀,                                         (4)                           
where 𝛽 = −1 𝜃, 𝛼 = 𝜇 𝜃, then we regress 𝑦 on 𝑥 using the OLS method. In the second 
step, based on the regression results obtained from the first step, we compute the value of 
marginal labor-capital return 𝜇, which equals to the inverse of the ratio of the intercept to the 
slope coefficient, that is 𝜇 = −𝛼 𝛽. Furthermore, by Rational Agent Hypothesis, we drop the 
super-low income samples whose values are less than 𝜇, and again we run an OLS regression to 
the “new” sample. 
To illustrate our testing process, we first apply the aforementioned empirical strategy to 
United Kingdom. In the years of 1999-2000 to 2013-2014, following the maximal adjusted 𝑅! 
rule, we drop the super high income data first. According to our theoretical formulation, the high 
income people do not conform to the assumptions of ADGEM. In fact, the number of these 
people is relatively small, but their total income is quite large. When the top-income samples are 
removed, based on the regression parameters of equation (3), we get the value of 𝜇, then we 
further drop the samples whose values are less than 𝜇. Once again, we run an OLS regression on 
the purged data to fit the data to our exponential distribution. For comparison, we also fit the data 
on the full sample; see the two panels in Fig.1 for details. Likewise, the same empirical testing 
procedure is applied to other countries around the world. The results of fitting are shown by Figs. 
2 and 3. Fig. 2 shows 34 mostly European countries for which Eurostat data are available, and 
Fig. 3 shows 33 countries from other areas. One can observe visually that agreement between 
theory and empirical data is very good. Furthermore, the goodness of fit parameters for the 
exponential income distribution (3) to 67 countries are reported in Tables S1-S3 (see Appendix 
F). We show that the adjusted 𝑅! of almost all these countries approach 0.99. 
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Here we point out that the method of removing the high income class using the maximized 𝑅! can be regarded as a filtering procedure. By our model, the exponential function fits the 
middle range of income distribution, so it is necessary to filter out the data at the high and low 
ends of distribution to reveal the exponential pattern. The filtering is always inevitable in any 
data analysis performed to extract signal from noisy or mixed data, so it is not an absolute 
question of data integrity, but rather a practical one of whether the filtering procedure is 
reasonable or not. We believe that our procedure above is reasonably reliable and convincing, 
because it converges after removal of a quite small fraction of the data. Later, we will observe 
that the estimated value of 𝜇 produced by the filtering procedure for maximized 𝑅! indeed 
agrees with empirical data. Despite this, we still do not verify that the estimate of 𝜇 produced 
by the filtering procedure is consistent. In fact, because we only collect the sample data of 
household income, we must prove that the estimated value of 𝜇 sufficiently approaches the true 
value when the number of sample is large enough; otherwise, we cannot guarantee that the 
estimate of 𝜇 proposed by us is consistent. In next section, we will show that the estimate of 𝜇 
produced by filtering procedure is consistent. 
4. Consistent estimate of 𝝁 
   In section 3, we have shown that the exponential distribution (3) remarkably fits the low and 
middle parts of household income data from 67 countries. The only problem is that we don’t 
know if the fitting procedure produces the consistent estimate of 𝜇. For the full data (i.e., 
population), the equation (4) can be written as: 𝑦! = 𝛽∗𝑥! + 𝛼∗ + 𝜀!,                                                   (5) 
where 𝛽∗ = − !!∗ , 𝛼∗ = !∗!∗ , and 𝜀!~𝑁 0,𝜎!  for 𝑗 = 1,2,… ,∞ . Here 𝑥! !!!!  and 𝑦! !!!!  
denote the full data. 𝛽∗ and 𝛼∗ are obtained by regressing 𝑦! !!!!  on 𝑥! !!!! . 
It must be noted that, due to the constraint 𝑥 ≥ 𝜇, the equation (3) differs slightly from the 
equation (5). Therefore, we cannot ensure if 𝜇∗ = 𝜇. In fact, the equation (3) implies that 𝑥! !!!!  should be a strictly monotonic increasing sequence with 𝑥! ≥ 0 for 𝑗 = 1,2,… ,∞. 
More importantly, it indicates that there exists a positive integer 𝑔∗ to guarantee 𝑥! ≥ 𝜇 for 𝑘 = 𝑔∗,𝑔∗ + 1,… ,∞. This means that, for the full data, the equation (3) should be written as: 𝑦! = 𝛽𝑥! + 𝛼 + 𝜀!𝑥! ≥ 𝜇 ,                                                   (6)                                                     
where  𝛽 = − !! , 𝛼 = !! , and 𝜀!~𝑁 0,𝜎!  for 𝑘 = 𝑔∗,𝑔∗ + 1,… ,∞ . Here 𝛽  and 𝛼  are 
obtained by regressing 𝑦! !!!∗!  on 𝑥! !!!∗! . 
By Lemma 4 in Appendix E, we have proved that if 𝑔∗ < ∞, then one has 𝛽 = 𝛽∗, 𝛼 = 𝛼∗. 
Therefore, the equation (6) can be rewritten in the form: 
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 𝑦! = 𝛽∗𝑥! + 𝛼∗ + 𝜀!𝑥! ≥ 𝜇∗ ,                                                 (7) 
where  𝑘 = 𝑔∗,𝑔∗ + 1,… ,∞ and 𝑔∗ < ∞. 
   Obviously, our purpose is to find 𝜇. The equation (7) reminds us that if one can collect the 
full data 𝑥! !!!!  and 𝑦! !!!! , then 𝜇 can be obtained by computing 𝜇∗. Unfortunately, 
nobody can collect full data, so it’s impossible to obtain the equation (7). However, based on 
sample data 𝑥! !!!!  and 𝑦! !!!! , we can consider the following statistical estimate equation:  𝑦! = 𝛽!𝑥! + 𝛼!𝑥! ≥ 𝜇! ,                                                      (8) 
where  𝑖 = 𝑔,𝑔 + 1,… ,𝑛 and 𝑛 denotes sample size. It’s worth emphasizing that 𝑔 = 𝑔 𝑛  
is undetermined. 
   Here  
   𝛽! = !!!!! !!!!!!!!! !!!!! !!!!! ,                                                 (9) 
   𝛼! = 𝑦! − 𝛽!𝑥!,                                                      (10) 𝜇! = − !!!!, (11) 
   𝑥! = !!!!!! 𝑥!!!!! ,                                                   (12)                     𝑦! = !!!!!! 𝑦!!!!! .                                                   (13) 
   Due to the absence of full data, we cannot obtain 𝜇. However, we hope 𝜇! → 𝜇 if 𝑛 → ∞. 
In Appendix E, we have proved the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 3: For a strictly monotonic increasing sequence 𝑥! !!!! , if there exists an integer 𝑔 = 𝑔 𝑛  to guarantee: 
   (A).  𝑥!!! < 𝜇 < 𝑥! or 𝑥! = 𝜇, where 𝑖 = 𝑔 < 𝑛 and 𝑙𝑖𝑚!→! !! = 0; 
   (B). 
!!!! > 𝛿 > 0 for any 𝑛; 
then one has: 𝑙𝑖𝑚!→! 𝜇! = 𝑙𝑖𝑚!→! 𝑥! − !!!! = 𝜇,                                    (14) 
where 𝑔 is uniquely determined by 𝑛 and 𝑔 < ∞. This means: 
   𝑙𝑖𝑚!→! 𝑔 = 𝑔∗.                                                     (15)           
 
   Proof. See Appendix E. □ 
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Proposition 3 indicates that 𝜇! is a consistent estimate if (A) and (B) hold. That is to say, if 
the sample size 𝑛 is large enough, we expect that 𝜇! is extremely close to 𝜇. Because nobody 
can obtain 𝜇, our purpose can be changed to find a value close to 𝜇. Obviously, Proposition 3 
implies that the estimate 𝜇! will provide such a value. Next we show that (B) can be related to 
the correlation coefficient between 𝑥! !!!!  and 𝑦! !!!! . 
 
Lemma 5: If 𝑦! < 0 for 𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑛, and if 𝑟! < 0 for any 𝑛, then one has !!!! > 0 for any 𝑛, 
where 𝑟! = !!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! !∙ !!!!! !!!!!!!!!  denotes the correlation coefficient between 𝑥! !!!!  and 𝑦! !!!! . 
 
Proof. By equation (9) we have : 
   𝑟! = 𝛽! ∙ !!!!! !!!!! !!!!! !!!!! .                                                 (16) 
   Thus, if 𝑟! < 0 for any 𝑛, one concludes 𝛽! < 0 for any 𝑛, where we have used the 
Assumptions (b) and (c) in Appendix E. Since 𝑦! < 0 leads to 𝑦! < 0, we conclude3 !!!! > 0 
for any 𝑛. □ 
 
   By using Lemma 5, Proposition 3 leads to the following corollary. 
 
Corollary 1: For a strictly monotonic increasing sequence 𝑥! !!!! , if 𝑦! < 0 for 𝑗 = 1,… ,𝑛, 
and if there exists an integer 𝑔 = 𝑔 𝑛  to guarantee: 
   (C). 𝑥!!! < 𝜇 < 𝑥! or 𝑥! = 𝜇, where 𝑖 = 𝑔 < 𝑛 and 𝑙𝑖𝑚!→! !! = 0; 
   (D). 𝑟! < 𝛾 < 0 for any 𝑛; 
then one has: 
   𝑙𝑖𝑚!→! 𝜇! = 𝜇,                                            
where 𝑔 is uniquely determined by 𝑛 and 𝑔 < ∞. This means: 
   𝑙𝑖𝑚!→! 𝑔 = 𝑔∗. 	
                    
																																								 																				 	
3 Here we have considered 𝑙𝑖𝑚!→! 𝑦! ≠ 0. 
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Proof. Using Proposition 3 and Lemma 5 we complete this proof. □ 
 
   Obviously, equation (3) implies 𝑦! < 0 for 𝑖 = 𝑔,𝑔 + 1,… ,𝑛. Therefore, we can employ 
the Corollary 1 to seek 𝜇!. The step is as below: 
   First, we seek the minimal 𝑙 to satisfy 𝑟! < 0 for 𝑥! !!!!  and 𝑦! !!!! . Second, we regress 𝑥! !!!!  and 𝑦! !!!!  to obtain ℎ and 𝜇!. Third, we test 𝑟!: If 𝑟! < 0 holds, we conclude that 
the regress result 𝜇! = 𝜇! is a valid estimate value; if 𝑟! ≥ 0, we use 𝑥! !!!!  and 𝑦! !!!!  to 
repeat the steps 1-3. The computing process should end at the finite steps; otherwise, 𝑥! !!!!  
and 𝑦! !!!!  do not fit equation (3). 
   It’s easy to check that the filtering procedure in section 3 is in accordance with the three steps 
above, provided that 𝑟! < 0 holds. For simplicity, we only list the	 correlation coefficients 𝑟! 
for the United Kingdom in Table 1, which are all negative. The readers can test the other 
countries, which also exhibit the negative correlation coefficients (see Fig. 2-3). Therefore, we 
believe that the estimate values for 𝜇 computed in Tables S1-S3 are convincing. It’s worth 
mentioning that the assumption 𝜀!~𝑁 0,𝜎!  in equation (6) holds if and only if the 
high-income samples can be adequately removed. This is because high-income samples, which 
obey the power law, will lead to systematic errors so that 𝜀!~𝑁 0,𝜎!  breaks down. In section 
3, we remove the high-income samples (systematic errors) based on the rule of maximized 𝑅! 
to get the estimate value 𝜇!. However, the rule of maximized 𝑅! is not the unique method. In 
fact, Fig. 1 implies that, for the United Kingdom, we may remove only three quantile in 
high-income samples to get 𝜇!. Remarkably, the Proposition 3 implies that 𝜇! should be close 
to 𝜇! if the sample size is large enough. In terms of our data, the United Kingdom data has the 
most quantile, and so yields the largest sample size (approximately equals 100). Therefore, it’s 
better to compare the estimate values 𝜇! and 𝜇! in terms of the United Kingdom data. We 
have listed the results in Table 1, where the readers can check that the differences only yield the 
order of 0.01. 
5. Discussion 
The empirical results above imply that the exponential income law universally holds in most 
countries all over the world. Because we have investigated 67 countries from different areas, the 
validity of exponential income law appears to be robust. Compared to log-normal and gamma 
distributions, which have two or more fitting parameters, the exponential law essentially has only 
one fitting parameter 1 𝜃, and produces a more parsimonious fit of the data. More importantly, 
our exponential law (3) is compatible with the standard model of modern economics (namely 
ADGEM); therefore, the fitting parameters 𝜇 and 𝜃 have explicit economic meaning. In fact, 𝜇 denotes the marginal labor-capital return, and it is proportional to the minimum wage (Tao 
2017). Concretely, we can obtain (Tao 2017): 𝜇 = 𝜎 ∙ 𝜔 − 𝜎 ∙ 𝑟 ∙𝑀𝑅𝑇𝑆!",                                           (17) 
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where 𝜎 denotes the marginal employment level, 𝜔 denote the minimum wage, 𝑟 denotes the 
interest rate, and 𝑀𝑅𝑇𝑆!" denotes the marginal rate of technical substitution of labor and 
capital. The brief derivation for equation (17) can be found in Appendix D. 
The marginal employment level 𝜎 stands for the increasing number of employment once a 
firm enters markets (Tao 2017); therefore, it’s easy to understand 𝜎 ≥ 0. Thus, equation (17) 
implies that the marginal labor-capital return 𝜇 is theoretically proportional to the minimum 
wage 𝜔. Obviously, the minimum wage 𝜔, like unemployment compensation, can be regarded 
as a critical income level at which labors would like to enter or exit markets. Therefore, we 
might as well identify 𝜔 by the unemployment compensation.  
To test the relationship between 𝜇 and 𝜔, we collected the unemployment compensation 
data for 26 European countries in the years of 2011 to 2014. Using the computed values of 𝜇 for 
European countries from Table S2, we can directly test if there is a positive relationship between 
marginal labor-capital return and unemployment compensation by the OLS regression. The 
empirical results are shown in Fig. 4 and Table S4 (see Appendix F). From these results we find 
that the marginal labor-capital return 𝜇 (i.e., MLCR in Fig. 4), is strongly positive correlated 
with the unemployment compensation (i.e., UC in Fig. 4), with the Pearson correlation 
coefficients being separately 0.864, 0.904, 0.899 and 0.880 (from 2011 to 2014). Remarkably, 
the confidence levels of correlation coefficients are surprisingly high, since 𝑝-value < 0.001 
for all four years, as shown in Table S4. It is worth mentioning that the equation (17) implies that 𝜇  is inversely proportional to 𝑟  if4  𝑀𝑅𝑇𝑆!" > 0  (Tao 2017). Recently, Tao (2017) has 
collected the real data of the interest rate 𝑟 to do the cross-section regression between 𝜇,  𝜔 
and 𝑟. Tao’s empirical results show that the marginal labor-capital return 𝜇 is indeed inversely 
proportional to the interest rate 𝑟 (Tao 2017).   
Due to the robust results of our study, some significant policy recommendations can be made: 
by moderately increasing the level of unemployment compensation, the income inequalities 
originated from low and middle income classes may be reduced, because the Gini coefficient of 
the exponential distribution is equal to 𝐺 = 1 2 1+ 𝜇 𝜃 , see detailed derivation in Tao et al 
(2017). To keep efficiency and fairness in competitive markets, we propose that the source of 
paying unemployment compensation should come from levying a tax on high income class. This 
is because, unlike high income class, the low and middle income class evolves to a competitive 
equilibrium combining efficiency and Rawls’ fairness. The traditional tax policy which 
artificially changes the income structure of low and middle income class may harm market 
efficiency and fairness. 
6. Conclusion  
We have shown that the standard Arrow-Debreu’s general equilibrium model combined with 
Rawls’ fairness principle naturally produces the exponential distribution of income, which agrees 
well with the empirical data for 67 countries around the world. These results provide a solid 
																																								 																				 	
4 When labor 𝐿 and capital 𝐾 substitute with each other, we have 𝑀𝑅𝑇𝑆!" > 0. 
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justification for the exponential income distribution within the mainstream economic framework. 
Furthermore, our findings may have broader socio-economic implications, because the 
exponential income law is, effectively, a result of natural selection of the likeliest (Whitfield 
2007; Tao 2016), i.e. the most probable, distribution. The Arrow-Debreu’s general equilibrium 
model describes an ideal institutional environment (similar to ecological environment), which 
permits different income structures. Relative to other structures, the exponential income 
distribution occurs with the highest probability, and so it represents survival of	 the likeliest 
structure, also named as “Spontaneous Order” (Tao 2016). These results are relevant for 
evolutionary economics (Mackmurdo 1940; Nelson and Winter 1982;	Potts 2001; Hodgson 2004; 
Dopfer 2004; Foster and Metcalfe 2012), which is concerned with the direction of social 
evolution. The exponential distribution (2) is obtained by maximization of entropy 𝑙𝑛𝛺 (see 
Appendix D), which indicates the direction of evolution. According to neoclassical economics, 
the entropy in our model is interpreted as technological progress (Tao 2016), as discussed in 
Appendix D, so the higher technological progress is the likeliest direction of social evolution:	
among all possible social systems, those whose technological level happens to be the highest will 
be “selected” as survivors. In other words, those social systems that possess the lower 
technological level will be more likely eliminated in the process of social evolution. Our insights 
seem to be in accordance with the existing historical facts. 
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Fig. 1. Exponential fits on full and truncated income data for the United Kingdom. The 
vertical axis displays cumulative percentage of population in a logarithmic scale. The horizontal 
axis shows annual income rescaled by dividing by the θ-value of each year. The data and fits for 
each country are shifted vertically for clarity; each line of fit intersects the vertical axis at 100% 
population. The fitting parameters and auxiliary information regarding the fits are given in Table 
S1. HMRC SPI means Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, Survey of Personal Incomes. 
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Fig. 2. Exponential fits on truncated income data for the European Union in 2014 and its 
neighboring countries. The vertical axis shows cumulative percentage of population in a 
logarithmic scale. The horizontal axis shows income rescaled by dividing by the corresponding 
θ-value of each country. The data and fits for each country are shifted vertically for clarity; each 
line of fit intersects the vertical axis at 100% cumulative percentage of population. The fitting 
parameters and auxiliary information are given in Table S2. EU-SILC means European Union 
Statistics on Income and Living Conditions. 
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Fig. 3. Exponential fits on truncated income distribution data for various countries over 
various years. The vertical axis displays cumulative percentage of population in a logarithmic 
scale. The horizontal axis shows income rescaled by dividing by the corresponding θ-value of 
each country. The data and fits for each country are shifted vertically for clarity; each line of fit 
intersects the vertical axis at 100% cumulative percentage of population. The fitting parameters 
and auxiliary information regarding the fits are given in Table S3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
16	
	
 
 
Fig. 4. Statistical fit of the relationship between marginal labor-capital return (MLCR) and 
unemployment compensation (UC). The vertical axis displays MLCR, the horizontal axis 
shows UC. Cross-section datasets come from 26 European countries in the year of 2011, 2012, 
2013 and 2014. The local currency units (LCU) of some countries are not the euro (EUR), so 
annual average exchange rates, collected from Eurostat, are used to convert the UC values from 
LCU to EUR. The slope coefficients equal to 0.290, 0.315, 0.331, and 0.320 in the four 
following years, and the Pearson correlation coefficients between the two variables are 
separately 0.864, 0.904, 0.899 and 0.880, referring to Table S4 for details. Both the slope 
parameters and Pearson correlation coefficients are highly significant. 
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Year 𝑟! 𝜇! 𝜇! 
1999-2000 -0.998869 5662 5620 
2000-2001 -0.998795 5608 5538 
2001-2002 -0.998889 6017 5918 
2002-2003 -0.998872 6139 6028 
2003-2004 -0.998655 6167 6026 
2004-2005 -0.999193 6198 6090 
2005-2006 -0.999341 6301 6258 
2006-2007 -0.999275 6502 6479 
2007-2008 -0.999174 6790 6775 
2009-2010 -0.999333 7638 7644 
2010-2011 -0.999467 7559 7548 
2011-2012 -0.999281 8224 8333 
2012-2013 -0.999201 8869 9000 
2013-2014 -0.99898 9690 9906 
Table 1. Correlation coefficients and estimate 𝝁𝒈 for the United Kingdom. The data used 
reports gross annual individual income after taxes for tax years 1999-2000 to 2013-2014. 𝜇! is 
the estimate value of 𝜇 based on removing three quantile in high-income samples, and 𝜇! is 
the estimate value of 𝜇 based on the maximized 𝑅! as reported in Table S1. 
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APPENDIX  
A. 𝑵-person Non-cooperative Game 
   Arrow-Debreu’s General Equilibrium Model (ADGEM) is based on the well-known two 
criteria of neoclassical economics: utility maximization and profit maximization. If there are 𝑁 
consumers, each of whom operates a firm, the ADGEM describing their optimal behavior uses 
the following principles (Tao 2015, 2016):  
   (a). Profit maximization: For each firm 𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑁, 𝑦!∗ ∈ 𝑌! maximizes profits such that 𝑃 ∙ 𝑦! ≤ 𝑃 ∙ 𝑦!∗ for all 𝑦! ∈ 𝑌!. 
   (b). Utility maximization: For each consumer 𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑁 , 𝑥!∗ ∈ 𝑋!  is the solution of 
maximizing the preference 
i~
≻  under the budget set: 𝑥! ∈ 𝑋!:𝑝 ∙ 𝑥! ≤ 𝑝 ∙ 𝜔! + 𝜃!"𝑝 ∙ 𝑦!∗!!!! . 
   (c). Market clearing: 𝑥!∗!!!! = 𝜔!!!!! + 𝑦!∗!!!! . 
   Here 𝑥! and 𝑋! represent consumption vector and consumption set of the 𝑖th consumer, 
respectively; 𝑦!  and 𝑌!  represent production vector and production set of the 𝑖 th firm, 
respectively (Mas-Collel, Whinston, and Green 1995); 𝜃!" represents an ownership share of 
each firm 𝑗 = 1,… ,𝑁 paid to the 𝑖th consumer. The allocation 𝑥!∗,… , 𝑥!∗ ;𝑦!∗,… ,𝑦!∗  and a 
price vector 𝑝 = 𝑝!,… ,𝑝!  constitute a Pareto optimal solution to ADGEM (a)-(c). 
 
B. Rawls’ Fairness of “2-Person Allocation” 
 
For illustration, let us consider a simple “2-person society” in which the GDP is denoted by 
＄2 and each person can earn a possible equilibrium income with ＄0, ＄1 or ＄2. For the 
“2-person society”, the equation (1) can be expressed in the form: 𝐼! = 0,1,2   𝑓𝑜𝑟   𝑖 = 1,2𝐼!!!!! = 2 .                                             (B.1) 
By equation (B.1), the “2-person society” will have three equilibrium income allocation 
(EIA): 𝐴! = 0,2 , 𝐴! = 2,0  and 𝐴! = 1,1 . They have been shown as below: 
 
       Case 1 (𝐴!)            Case 2 (𝐴!)             Case 3 (𝐴!)      
          $0                $2  $1       
          $2                $0                 $1         
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By Rawls’ principle of fair equality of opportunity, each EIA should occur with an equal 
probability (Tao 2015, 2016); therefore, each person’s expected income equals ＄1. The detailed 
calculation is as below: 
   Probability(𝐴!)=1/3, Probability(𝐴!)=1/3, Probability(𝐴!)=1/3 
   Woman’s Expected Income = 0× 1 3 + 2× 1 3 + 1× 1 3 =1          (B.2) 
   Man’s Expected Income = 2× 1 3 + 0× 1 3 + 1× 1 3 =1             (B.3) 
This means that each person owns the equal opportunity of earning money. If we denote the 
equal income distribution by 𝑎 and the unequal income distribution by 𝑏, we do have 𝑎 = 𝐴!  and 𝑏 = 𝐴!,𝐴! . By Rawls’ principle of fair equality of opportunity, 𝑎 will occur 
with probability 1 3 and 𝑏 will occur with probability 2 3. Following the rule of “survival of 
the likeliest”, 𝑏 will be a result of natural selection. 
 
C. Density Function of Income	Distribution 
 
For “𝑁-person allocation”, Tao has shown that, by applying Rawls’ fairness into equation (1) 
where 𝑁 and 𝑌 are large enough, one will get the exponential income distribution which 
occurs with the highest probability (Tao 2015, 2016): 𝑎! = 𝑔!𝑒! !!!!!  ,                                                    (C.1) 
   𝜀! < 𝜀! < ⋯ < 𝜀!. 
   Here 𝜇  and 𝜃  denote marginal labor-capital return and marginal technology return, 
respectively (Tao 2016); readers can find the origin of these two parameters in Appendix D. 
   The formula (C.1) indicates that there are 𝑎! consumers each of which obtains 𝜀! units of 
revenue, and 𝑘 runs from 1 to 𝑛. Because income distribution (C.1) will occur with the highest 
probability, Tao call it the “spontaneous economic order” (Tao 2016).  
The formula (C.1) can be rewritten in the form of continuous function. To see this, let us first 
observe:  𝑎!!!!! = 𝑁,                                                       (C.2)  
which leads to: 
   !!!!!!! = 1.                                                        (C.3) 
Here !!!  denotes the proportion of populations each of whom earns 𝜀! units of income. 
Now we write !!!  in the form of continuous function: 𝑓 𝑥 . To this end, let us order: 𝑓 𝑥 = 𝑤 ∙ 𝑒! !!!! ,                                                   (C.4) 
where 𝑥 , which replaces 𝜀! , denotes a continuous income level, and by Rational Agent 
Hypothesis one has (Tao 2010) 𝑥 ≥ 𝜇. 
   Here 𝑤 is an undetermined constant, which will be determined by the sum formula (C.3). 
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Let us replace !!!  by (C.4), and transform sum operation of formula (C.3) into integral operation: 
   𝑤 ∙ 𝑒! !!!!!!! 𝑑𝑥 = 1,                                               (C.5) 
which leads to 𝑤 = !!. 
   Finally, we obtain the density function of income distribution: 
   𝑓 𝑥 = !! 𝑒! !!!! .                                                     (C.6)                                          
                                                      
D. Technological Progress and Entropy 
 
   Because the firm consists of labor and capital, the Cobb-Douglas aggregate production 
function (or GDP) of neoclassical economics can be written in the form (Tao 2010, 2016): 
   𝑌 = 𝑌 𝑁 𝐿,𝐾 ,𝐻 ,                                                  (D.1) 
where 𝐿 and 𝐾 denote labor and capital, whereas 𝑁 and 𝐻 denote the number of firms and 
technological progress. 
The complete differential of (D.1) yields [see also Eq. (9) in Banerjee and Yakovenko 
(2010)]: 
   d𝑌 𝑁 𝐿,𝐾 ,𝐻 = 𝜇𝑑𝑁 𝐿,𝐾 + 𝜃𝑑𝐻,                                   (D.2) 
where 𝜇 = 𝜕𝑌 𝜕𝑁 and 𝜃 = 𝜕𝑌 𝜕𝐻 denote the marginal labor-capital return and the marginal 
technology return (Tao 2016), respectively. 
   Here Tao identifies the entropy 𝑙𝑛𝛺 with the technological progress 𝐻 (Tao 2010, 2016): 
   𝐻 = 𝑙𝑛𝛺,                                                          (D.3) 
where 𝛺 denotes the number of equilibrium income allocations that a given income distribution 
contains (Furthermore, 𝛺 also measures the choice freedom of social members (Tao 2016)). For 
example, for the 2-person society described by Appendix B, we have 𝛺 𝑎 = 1 and 𝛺 𝑏 = 2. 
By maximizing (Tao 2010, 2015, 2016) 𝛺 one can obtain the exponential income distribution 
(2). Consequently, the technological progress 𝐻  can be regarded as the entropy of 
socio-economical systems. 
Furthermore, the complete differential of equation (D.1) can be rewritten in the form: 𝑑𝑌 = 𝜔𝑑𝐿 + 𝑟𝑑𝐾 + 𝜃𝑑𝐻,                                             (D.4) 
where 𝜔 = 𝜕𝑌 𝜕𝐿 and 𝑟 = 𝜕𝑌 𝜕𝐾 denote marginal labor return and marginal capital return 
(Tao 2017), respectively. On the one hand, we might as well assume that capital markets exhibit 
perfect competition, so 𝑟 also denotes the interest rate. On the other hand, by the principle of 
diminishing marginal return in neoclassical economics, 𝜔  denotes the minimum wage. 
Comparing equations (D.2) and (D.4), we can obtain (Tao 2017): 𝜇 = 𝜔 ∙ 𝜎 − 𝑟 ∙ 𝜎 ∙𝑀𝑅𝑇𝑆!",                                           (D.5) 
where 𝜎 = 𝑑𝐿 𝑑𝑁 and 𝑀𝑅𝑇𝑆!" = −𝑑𝐾 𝑑𝐿. Here 𝜎 denotes the marginal employment level 
and 𝑀𝑅𝑇𝑆!" denotes the marginal rate of technical substitution of labor and capital (Tao 2017).  
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E. Main Propositions 
 
To obtain the consistent estimate of 𝜇, we do the estimate analysis in terms of two cases: full 
sample and truncation sample. In this paper, 𝑙𝑖𝑚!→! 𝑎! = 𝑎 means 𝑙𝑖𝑚!→! 𝑃 𝑎! = 𝑎 = 1, 
where 𝑃 𝜉  denotes the probability of 𝜉 occurring. 
 
E1. Full Sample 
 
Let us first drop the constraint 𝑥 ≥ 𝜇. For the full data (i.e., population), the equations (4) 
can be written in the form: 𝑦! = 𝛽∗𝑥! + 𝛼∗ + 𝜀!,                                                  (E.1) 𝜇∗ = − !∗!∗,                                                          (E.2) 
where 𝛽∗ = − !!∗ , 𝛼∗ = !∗!∗ , and 𝜀!~𝑁 0,𝜎!  for 𝑗 = 1,2,… ,∞ . Here 𝑥! !!!!  and 𝑦! !!!!  
denote the full data. 𝛽∗ and 𝛼∗ are obtained by regressing 𝑦! !!!!  on 𝑥! !!!! . 
   For the full sample5, the sample estimates of equations (E.1) and (E.2) yield: 
   𝑦! = 𝛽𝑥! + 𝛼,                                                       (E.3) 
   𝜇 = − !!,                                                           (E.4) 
where 𝑖 = 1,2,… ,𝑛. 
Due to the absence of the constraint 𝑥 ≥ 𝜇, equation (E.1) differs slightly from equation (3); 
therefore, we don’t ensure if 𝜇∗ = 𝜇. In section E2, we will discuss the estimate of 𝜇 when 𝑥 ≥ 𝜇 holds. In this section, we mainly investigate the consistency of the estimate (E.4). 
   Taking the least squares estimation on equation (E.3) we have: 
   𝛽 = !!!! !!!!!!!! !!!! !!!!! ,                                                   (E.5) 
   𝛼 = 𝑦 − 𝛽𝑥,                                                         (E.6) 
where 𝑥 = !! 𝑥!!!!!  and 𝑦 = !! 𝑦!!!!! . 
   Since the exponential distribution (3) is only suitable for the low and middle parts of the 
income data, we should drop the high income data. Moreover, due to the economic meanings of 𝑥! in the equation (3), 𝑥! !!!!  should be a monotonic increasing sequence. Thus, we can make 
the following assumptions. 
 
Assumptions: (a). 𝑥! < ∞ and 𝑦! < ∞ for 𝑖 = 1,2,… ,𝑛. 
            (b). 𝑥! !!!!  is strictly monotonic increasing sequence with 𝑥! ≥ 0  for 𝑖 = 1,2,… ,𝑛.  
																																								 																				 	
5 Full sample means 𝑥!,… , 𝑥! , where 𝑛 denotes the sample size. 
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(c). 𝜀! are i.i.d. 𝑁 0,𝜎! . 
 
   Next we verify that 𝛽 and 𝛼 are consistent estimates.    
 
Theorem 1: Assume that 𝜀! are i.i.d. 𝑁 0,𝜎! . If there is 𝑙𝑖𝑚!→! 𝑿!𝑿 !! = 𝟎, then one has: 
   𝑙𝑖𝑚!→! 𝛽 = 𝛽∗,                                                       (E.7) 
   𝑙𝑖𝑚!→! 𝛼 = 𝛼∗,                                                       (E.8) 
where 𝑿 = 𝑥! ⋯ 𝑥!1 ⋯ 1 !. 
 
   Proof. See Lai, Robbins, and Wei (1979). □ 
 
To verify equations (E.7) and (E.8), we can only prove the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 1: 𝑙𝑖𝑚!→! 𝑿!𝑿 !! = 𝟎. 
 
   Proof. It’s easy to compute:  𝑿!𝑿 !! = !! !!!!!!! ! !!!!!! ! 𝑛 − 𝑥!!!!!− 𝑥!!!!! 𝑥!!!!!! ,  
so proving 𝑙𝑖𝑚!→! 𝑿!𝑿 !! = 𝟎 is equivalent to verifying: 𝑙𝑖𝑚!→! !! !!!!!!! ! !!!!!! ! 𝑛 − 𝑥!!!!!− 𝑥!!!!! 𝑥!!!!!! = 0 00 0 .                   (E.9) 
   Obviously, proving equation (E.9) is equivalent to verifying the following three equations: 
   𝑙𝑖𝑚!→! !! !!!!!!! ! !!!!!! ! = 0,                                           (E.10) 
   𝑙𝑖𝑚!→! !!!!!!! !!!!!!! ! !!!!!! ! = 0, (E.11) 
   𝑙𝑖𝑚!→! !!!!!!!! !!!!!!! ! !!!!!! ! = 0. (E.12) 
   One can compute: 𝑛 𝑥!!!!!! − 𝑥!!!!! ! = 𝑛! !! 𝑥!!!!!! − 𝑥 ! .                             (E.13) 
   Furthermore, we have the following result: 
   !! 𝑥!!!!!! − 𝑥 ! = !! 𝑥!!!!!! − 2 𝑥 ! + 𝑥 ! = !! 𝑥! − 𝑥 !!!!! .               (E. 14) 
   By Assumption (b) we must have 𝑥! − 𝑥 !!!!! ≠ 0; otherwise, 𝑥! = 𝑥 for 𝑖 = 1,2,… ,𝑛, 
contradicting the strict monotonicity. On the other hand, by the strict monotonicity, there should 
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be at most one number 𝑥! leading to 𝑥! = 𝑥. Thus, if we order min!!! 𝑥! − 𝑥 = 𝐴, then we 
have 𝑥! − 𝑥 !!!!! ≥ 0+ 𝑛 − 1 ∙ 𝐴!. 
   Consequently, by equation (E.14) we can obtain: 
   !! 𝑥!!!!!! − 𝑥 ! = !! 𝑥! − 𝑥 !!!!! ≥ !!!! ∙ 𝐴!.                           (E.15) 
   Using equations (E.13) and (E.15) one has 
   !! !!!!!!! ! !!!!!! ! = !!! !! !!!!!!! ! ! ! ≤ !!!∙!!!! ∙!! = !!∙ !!! ∙!!.                 (E.16) 
   On the other hand, by Assumption (a), we can order 𝑚𝑎𝑥! 𝑥! = 𝐵; therefore, we have: 
   𝑥!!!!! = 𝑥!!!!! ≤ 𝑛 ∙ 𝐵,                                            (E.17) 
   𝑥!!!!!! = 𝑥!!!!!! ≤ 𝑛 ∙ 𝐵!.                                           (E.18) 
   Using equations (E.16)-(E.18), we can obtain: 
   !! !!!!!!! ! !!!!!! ! ≤ !!∙ !!! ∙!! = !!!! ∙!!.                                 (E.19) 
   !!!!!!! !!!!!!! ! !!!!!! ! ≤ !∙!!∙ !!! ∙!! = !!!! ∙!!.                                 (E.20) 
   !!!!!!!! !!!!!!! ! !!!!!! ! ≤ !∙!!!∙ !!! ∙!! = !!!!! ∙!!.                                 (E.21) 
   Imposing 𝑛 → ∞ on equations (E.19)-(E.21) one can obtain equations (E.10)-(E.12). □ 
 
   By using the Theorem 1, it’s easy to compute: 
   𝑙𝑖𝑚!→! 𝜇 = − !∗!∗ = 𝜇∗.                                                (E.22) 
   Equation (E.22) indicates that if there is no the constraint 𝑥 ≥ 𝜇, then the estimate 𝜇 is 
consistent. However, the existence of the constraint 𝑥 ≥ 𝜇 may lead to the inconsistency of 
estimate 𝜇.  
 
E2. Truncation sample 
 
Now let us recover the constraint 𝑥 ≥ 𝜇. Since the constraint 𝑥 ≥ 𝜇 holds, we attempt to 
construct a truncation estimate of 𝜇. To this end, we might as well assume that 𝜇 has existed. 
Thus, the truncation of the full data 𝑥! can be written as: 
   𝑥! ≥ 𝜇,                                                            (E.23) 
where 𝑗 = 𝑔∗,𝑔∗ + 1,… ,∞. 
   Using the truncation data (E.23), equation (4) can be written as: 𝑦! = 𝛽𝑥! + 𝛼 + 𝜀!,                                                 (E.24) 𝑥! ≥ 𝜇,                                                           (E.25) 
where 𝛽 = − !! , 𝛼 = !! , and 𝜀!~𝑁 0,𝜎!  for 𝑘 = 𝑔∗,𝑔∗ + 1,… ,∞ . Here 𝛽  and 𝛼  are 
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obtained by regressing 𝑦! !!!∗!  on 𝑥! !!!∗! . 
Thus, the sample estimates of equations (E.24) and (E.25) yield: 
   𝑦! = 𝛽!𝑥! + 𝛼!,                                                     (E.26) 
   𝑥! ≥ 𝜇!,                                                           (E.27) 
where 𝑖 = 𝑔,𝑔 + 1,… ,𝑛 and 𝑔 = 𝑔 𝑛 . Here 𝑥! !!!!  and 𝑦! !!!!  denote truncation sample. 
It’s worth emphasizing that 𝑔∗ and 𝑔 = 𝑔 𝑛  are undetermined. 
Taking the least squares estimation on equation (E.26) we have: 
   𝛽! = !!!!! !!!!!!!!! !!!!! !!!!! ,                                               (E.28) 
   𝛼! = 𝑦! − 𝛽!𝑥!,                                                    (E.29) 
where 𝑥! = !!!!!! 𝑥!!!!!  and 𝑦! = !!!!!! 𝑦!!!!! . 
The main purpose of this section is to derive the estimate 𝜇!. Assume 𝑔∗ < ∞, thus we will 
have the following theorem and proposition: 
    
Theorem 2: Assume that 𝜀! are i.i.d. 𝑁 0,𝜎! . If there is 𝑙𝑖𝑚!→! 𝑿!∗! 𝑿!∗ !! = 𝟎, then one 
has: 
   𝑙𝑖𝑚!→! 𝛽!∗ = 𝛽,                                                    (E.30) 
   𝑙𝑖𝑚!→! 𝛼!∗ = 𝛼,                                                    (E.31) 
where 𝑿!∗ = 𝑥!∗ ⋯ 𝑥!1 ⋯ 1 !. 
 
   Proof. Same as the Theorem 1. □	
	
Proposition 2: 𝑙𝑖𝑚!→! 𝑿!∗! 𝑿!∗ !! = 𝟎. 
 
	 	 	 Proof. Same as the Proposition 1. □	
 
   Consistent with the form of equation (E.4), 𝜇! can be defined as: 
   𝜇! = − !!!!.                                                        (E.32) 
   Now we start to derive the consistent condition of guaranteeing the validity of estimate 
(E.32).  
Substituting equation (E.29) into (E.32) one has: 
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   𝜇! = 𝑥! − !!!!,                                                      (E.33) 
which guarantees that the constraint of equation (E.26) has been imposed on the estimate (E.32). 
   On the other hand, equation (E.27) indicates: 
   𝑥! > 𝜇! + 𝛿,                                                      (E.34) 
where we have used the Assumption (b) and 𝛿 > 0. 
   Inserting equation (E.33) into equation (E.34) yield: 
   
!!!! > 𝛿 > 0,                                                       (E.35) 
which guarantees that the constraint of equation (E.27) has been imposed on the estimate (E.32). 
   Thus, we can obtain the core proposition of this Appendix as below: 
 
Proposition 3: For a strictly monotonic increasing sequence 𝑥! !!!! , if there exists an integer 𝑔 = 𝑔 𝑛  to guarantee: 
   (A). 𝑥!!! < 𝜇 < 𝑥! or 𝑥! = 𝜇, where 𝑖 = 𝑔 < 𝑛 and 𝑙𝑖𝑚!→! !! = 0; 
   (B). 
!!!! > 𝛿 > 0 for any 𝑛; 
then one has: 
   𝑙𝑖𝑚!→! 𝜇! = 𝑙𝑖𝑚!→! 𝑥! − !!!! = 𝜇,                                    (E.36) 
where 𝑔 is uniquely determined by 𝑛 and 𝑔 < ∞. This means: 
   𝑙𝑖𝑚!→! 𝑔 = 𝑔∗.                                                     (E.37) 
 
   To verify the Proposition 3, we need to prove the following four lemmas: 
 
Lemma 1: If 𝜉! !!!!  is a monotonic sequence and if 𝜉! < ∞ for any 𝑖, then one has: 𝑙𝑖𝑚!→! 𝜉! = 𝜉,                                                     (E.38) 
where 𝜉 < ∞. 
 
   Proof. See the theorem 3.14 in Rudin (1976). □ 
 
Lemma 2: For the sequence 𝜉! !!!! , if 𝑙𝑖𝑚!→! 𝜉! = 𝜉, then one has: 
   𝑙𝑖𝑚!→! !! 𝜉!!!!! = 𝜉.                                                (E.39) 
 
Proof. Since 𝑙𝑖𝑚!→! 𝜉! = 𝜉, by the definition of limit, for every ϵ > 0 there always exists 
a positive integer 𝑁 so that when 𝑘 > 𝑁, one has:  𝜉! − 𝜉 < !!.                                                       (E.40) 
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   To verify equation (E.39), we only need to prove: 
   𝑙𝑖𝑚!→! !! 𝜉!!!!! − 𝜉 = 0;                                           (E.41) 
that is, for every ϵ > 0 there always exists a positive integer 𝑁! so that when 𝑛 > 𝑁!, one has:   !! 𝜉!!!!! − 𝜉 < 𝜖.                                                  (E.42) 
   It’s easy to compute: 
   !! 𝜉!!!!! − 𝜉  
   = !! 𝜉! − 𝜉 + 𝜉! − 𝜉!!!!!!!!!!  
   ≤ !! 𝜉! − 𝜉!!!! + !! 𝜉! − 𝜉!!!!!! .                                (E.43) 
   Because 𝑙𝑖𝑚!→! 𝜉! = 𝜉, it’s easy to verify that 𝜉! < ∞ and 𝜉 < ∞. Thus, one has 𝑚𝑎𝑥! 𝜉! − 𝜉 < ∞. Consequently, thanks to 𝑗 > 𝑁, equation (E.43) can be written in the form: 
   !! 𝜉!!!!! − 𝜉                                               ≤ !!𝑚𝑎𝑥! 𝜉! − 𝜉 + !!!! !! < !!𝑚𝑎𝑥! 𝜉! − 𝜉 + !!.                                               (E.44) 
where we have used equation (E.40). 
   It’s easy to compute 𝑙𝑖𝑚!→! !!𝑚𝑎𝑥! 𝜉! − 𝜉 = 0. This means that for every ϵ > 0 there 
always exists a positive integer 𝑁! so that when 𝑘 > 𝑁!, one has:   !!𝑚𝑎𝑥! 𝜉! − 𝜉 < !!.                                                 (E.45) 
   Let us order 𝑁! = 𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑁,𝑁! ; thus, substituting equation (E.45) into equation (E.44) we 
conclude that for every ϵ > 0 when 𝑛 > 𝑁!, there always holds: 
   !! 𝜉!!!!! − 𝜉 < 𝜖. □ 
  
Lemma 3: If 𝑙𝑖𝑚!→! !! = 0, one has: 𝑙𝑖𝑚!→! 𝑥! = 𝑙𝑖𝑚!→! 𝑥 = 𝑥, 
   𝑙𝑖𝑚!→! 𝑦! = 𝑙𝑖𝑚!→! 𝑦 = 𝑦, 
where 𝑥 = 𝑙𝑖𝑚!→! 𝑥! and 𝑦 = 𝛽∗𝑥 + 𝛼∗. 
 
   Proof. We first verify 𝑙𝑖𝑚!→! 𝑥! = 𝑙𝑖𝑚!→! 𝑥. It’s easy to check: 
   𝑥 = !! 𝑥!!!!! = !! 𝑥!!!!!!! + !!!!!! !!!!!! 𝑥!!!!! = !! 𝑥!!!!!!! + !!!!!! 𝑥! .               
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(E.46) 
Since 𝑙𝑖𝑚!→! !! = 0, imposing 𝑛 → ∞ on equation (E.46) one obtains: 𝑙𝑖𝑚!→! 𝑥! = 𝑙𝑖𝑚!→! 𝑥, 
where we have used 𝑥! < ∞. 
   Since Assumptions (a) and (b) hold, by using Lemma 1 one has: 𝑙𝑖𝑚!→! 𝑥! = 𝑥. This 
means that by using Lemma 2 one obtains 𝑙𝑖𝑚!→! 𝑥 = 𝑥. Therefore, we verify 𝑙𝑖𝑚!→! 𝑥! =𝑙𝑖𝑚!→! 𝑥 = 𝑥. 
   Now we start to verify 𝑙𝑖𝑚!→! 𝑦! = 𝑙𝑖𝑚!→! 𝑦 = 𝑦. 
   Based on the same technique from equation (E.46), by Assumption (a) we can verify 𝑙𝑖𝑚!→! 𝑦! = 𝑙𝑖𝑚!→! 𝑦. By using equation (E.1), one has: 
   𝑦 = 𝛽∗𝑥 + 𝛼∗ + 𝜀,                                                    (E.47) 
where 𝜀 = !! 𝜀!!!!! . 
   By Assumption (c) 𝜀! are i.i.d. 𝑁 0,𝜎! , so by using the law of large numbers, it’s easy to 
obtain: 
   𝑙𝑖𝑚!→! 𝜀 = 𝐸 𝜀! 𝑥!,… , 𝑥! = 0.                                        (E.48) 
   Therefore, substituting equation (E.48) into equation (E.47) leads to: 
   𝑙𝑖𝑚!→! 𝑦 = 𝛽∗ 𝑙𝑖𝑚!→! 𝑥 + 𝛼∗ + 𝑙𝑖𝑚!→! 𝜀 = 𝛽∗𝑥 + 𝛼∗. □ 
 
Lemma 4: If 𝑙𝑖𝑚!→! !! = 0, one has: 𝑙𝑖𝑚!→! 𝛽! = 𝑙𝑖𝑚!→! 𝛽 = 𝛽 = 𝛽∗.                                       (E.48) 𝑙𝑖𝑚!→! 𝛼! = 𝑙𝑖𝑚!→! 𝛼 = 𝛼 = 𝛼∗.                                       (E.49) 
 
Proof. Here we only verify equation (E.48). By the same technique, one can verify equation 
(E.49). 
It’s easy to check: 𝛽 = !!!! !!!!!!!! !!!! !!!!! = !! !!!! !!!!!!!!!! !!! !!!! !!!!!!!!!! !!!! !!!!!!! !!! !!!! !!!!! .                     (E.50) 
Imposing 𝑛 → ∞ on equation (E.50) one obtains: 𝑙𝑖𝑚!→! 𝛽 = !"#!→!!! !!!! !!!!!!!!!"#!→!!! !!!! !!!!! . 
= !"#!→!!! !!!!"#!→! ! !!!!"#!→! !!!!!!"#!→!!! !!!!"#!→! ! !!!!! ,                           (E.51) 
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where we have used 𝑥! < ∞, 𝑦! < ∞ and 𝑙𝑖𝑚!→! !! = 0. 
Using Lemma 3, equation (E.51) can be rewritten as: 𝑙𝑖𝑚!→! 𝛽 = !"#!→!!! !!!!"#!→! !! !!!!"#!→! !!!!!!!"#!→!!! !!!!"#!→! !! !!!!! . 
        = 𝑙𝑖𝑚!→! !!!!! !!!!!!!!! !!!!! !!!!!  = 𝑙𝑖𝑚!→! 𝛽!.                                                (E.52) 
Because 𝑔∗ < ∞, by the same technique for deriving equation (E.52), we can obtain: 𝑙𝑖𝑚!→! 𝛽 = 𝑙𝑖𝑚!→! 𝛽!∗. 
   On the other hand, by Theorem 1 one has 𝑙𝑖𝑚!→! 𝛽 = 𝛽∗ and by Theorem 2 one has 𝑙𝑖𝑚!→! 𝛽!∗ = 𝛽. Therefore, we conclude that equation (E.48) holds. □ 
 
   Now we start to verify the Proposition 3. 
 
Proof of Proposition 3. Imposing 𝑛 → ∞ on equation (E.33) one obtains: 𝑙𝑖𝑚!→! 𝜇! = 𝑙𝑖𝑚!→! 𝑥! − !"#!→! !!!"#!→! !!.                                    (E.53) 
Using Lemmas 1-4, equation (E.53) equals: 
   𝑙𝑖𝑚!→! 𝜇! = 𝑥 − !!.                                                  (E.54) 
   We have known 𝜇 = − !!. (E.55) 
Imposing 𝑛 → ∞ on equation (E.29) one obtains: 𝛼 = 𝑦 − 𝛽𝑥.                                                        (E.56) 
Substituting equations (E.55) and (E.56) into equation (E.54) yields: 𝑙𝑖𝑚!→! 𝜇! = 𝑥 − !! = 𝜇.                                              (E.57) 
   Because 
!!!! > 𝛿 > 0 for any 𝑛, by Lemmas 3 and 4 we have: 
   𝑙𝑖𝑚!→! !!!! = !! ≥ 𝛿 > 0.                                               (E.58) 
Thus, by equation (E.57) we must conclude: 𝜇 < 𝑥 < ∞,                                                         (E.59) 
where we have used 𝑥! < ∞. 
   Since 𝑥!!! < 𝜇 < 𝑥! or 𝑥! = 𝜇, by Assumption (b) we have:      
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   0 ≤ 𝜇 < 𝑥 < ∞.                                             
Now we further verify that, for a given 𝑛, there is no another 𝑔! ≠ 𝑔 to guarantee that 𝑥!!!! < 𝜇 < 𝑥!! or 𝑥!! = 𝜇. We discuss this point in terms of two cases. First, if 𝑥!!!! < 𝜇 <𝑥!! holds, we have to conclude 𝑥!!! < 𝜇 < 𝑥!! and 𝑥!!!! < 𝜇 < 𝑥!. For this case, we might 
as well assume 𝑔! > 𝑔, which by Assumption (b) leads to 𝑥!! > 𝑥!. This means 𝑥! ≤ 𝑥!!!, 
contradicting Assumption (b). Likewise, we can refute 𝑔! < 𝑔. Second, if 𝑥!! = 𝜇 and 𝑔! ≠ 𝑔, 
then by Assumption (b) the contradiction occurs. In summary, we must conclude 𝑔! = 𝑔. 
Finally, we verify 𝑔 < ∞. If 𝑔 = ∞, by 𝑥!!! < 𝜇 < 𝑥! or 𝑥! = 𝜇, we have to conclude 𝑙𝑖𝑚!→! 𝑥! = 𝜇 = 𝑥, which contradicts 𝜇 < 𝑥 < ∞.  
Based on the results above, we should have 𝑙𝑖𝑚!→! 𝑔 = 𝑔∗. To see this, we might as well 
assume that 𝑙𝑖𝑚!→! 𝑔 > 𝑔∗ . Then, by 𝑥!!! < 𝜇 = 𝑥!∗ < 𝑥! , one has 𝑙𝑖𝑚!→! 𝑔 − 1 = 𝑔∗ , 
which contradicts 𝑥!"#!→! !!! < 𝑥!∗, where we have used 𝑔 < ∞. □ 
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F. Description of Data Sources 
	
Source Countries Link 
Socio-Economic 
Database of Latin 
America and the 
Caribbean 
ARG, BLZ, BOL, BRA, CHL, COL, 
CRI, DOM, ECU, SLV, HTI, HND, 
MEX, PRY, PER, URY, VEN 
http://sedlac.econo.unlp.edu.ar/eng/statistics.php 
Australian Bureau of 
Statistics 
AUS http://www.ausstats.abs.gov.au/ausstats/subscriber.ns
f/0/B0530ECF7A48B909CA257BC80016E4D3/$Fil
e/65230_2011-12.pdf 
Eurostat AUT, BEL, BGR, HRV, CYP, CZE, 
DNK, EST, FIN, FRA, DEU, GRC, 
HUN, ISL, IRL, ITA, LVA, LTU, 
LUX, MKD, MLT, NLD, NOR, 
POL, PRT, ROU, SRB, SVK, SVN, 
ESP, SWE, CHE, TUR, GBR 
http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?data
set=ilc_di01&lang=en 
Statistics Canada CAN http://www.statcan.gc.ca/tables-tableaux/sum-som/l0
1/cst01/famil105a-eng.htm 
Hong Kong HKG http://www.census2011.gov.hk/pdf/household-incom
e.pdf 
Nepal Rastra Bank NPL http://www.nrb.org.np/red/publications/study_reports
/Study_Reports--Household%20Budget%20Survey
%202008%20(Report).pdf 
Russian Federal State 
Statistics Service 
RUS http://www.arcticstat.org/Table.aspx/Region/Russian
_Federation/Indicator/Personal!Household_Income/2
008-08-21-05/10874 
Singapore Department 
of Statistics 
SGP http://www.singstat.gov.sg/docs/default-source/defau
lt-document-library/publications/publications_and_p
apers/household_income_and_expenditure/pp-s22.pd
f 
Korean Statistical 
Information Service 
KOR http://kosis.kr/statHtml/statHtml.do?orgId=101&tblI
d=DT_1L6E001&conn_path=I2&language=en 
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National Statistical 
Office of Thailand 
THA http://web.nso.go.th/en/survey/house_seco/data/Who
le%20Kingdom_13_FullReport.pdf 
United Kingdom 
National Statistics 
GBR https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/upl
oads/attachment_data/file/503472/SPI_National_Stat
istics_T3_1_to_T3_11.pdf 
United States Census 
Bureau 
USA http://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/demo/tab
les/p60/252/table3.pdf 
Eurostat BGR, CZE, DNK, HUN, ISL, LTU, 
LVA, NOR, POL, SWE 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/exchange-rates/data/
database 
OECD Statistics AUT, BEL, BGR, CZE, CHE, DEU, 
DNK, ESP, EST, FIN, FRA, GRC, 
HUN, IRL, ISL, ITA, LTU, LUX, 
LVA, NLD, NOR, POL, PRT, SVK, 
SVN, SWE 
http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=FIXI
NCLSA# 
Federated States of 
Micronesia 
FSM http://prism.spc.int/images/documents/HEIS/2005_F
SM_HIES_Report-Final.pdf 
Department of Census 
and Statistics 
Ministry of Finance and 
Planning 
Sri Lanka 
LKA http://www.statistics.gov.lk/HIES/HIES2012Prelimi
neryReport.pdf 
Bangladesh Bureau of 
Statistics - Ministry of 
Planning 
BGD  http://catalog.ihsn.org/index.php/catalog/2257 
Liberia Institute for 
Statistics and 
Geo-Information 
Services - Government 
of Liberia 
LBR http://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/25
63 
Central Agency for 
Public Mobilization 
and Statistics 
EGY http://www.ilo.org/surveydata/index.php/catalog/126
1 
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(CAPMAS) - Arab 
Republic of Egypt 
Namibia Statistics 
Agency 
NAM http://www.ilo.org/surveydata/index.php/catalog/320 
China Institute for 
Income Distribution 
CHN http://www.ciidbnu.org/ 
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Table S1. Fitting parameters and auxiliary information for the data in Fig. 1. θ and µ are 
given in pounds sterling (GBP). % below xmin and % above xmax, respectively, show the 
percentage of the population below xmin and above xmax. Radj2 are the coefficients of 
determination for the fits. The data used reports gross annual individual income after taxes for 
tax years 1999-2000 to 2013-2014. As this is taxpayer data, income values below a minimum 
threshold are not reported in the survey. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Years θ µ x  x %	<	x  %	>	x R2adj
1999-00 9,436       5,620       10,100     47,300     6 6 0.9988
2000-01 9,965       5,538       9,060       46,000     6 5 0.9985
2001-02 10,488     5,918       8,360       45,300     6 5 0.9988
2002-03 10,614     6,028       7,580       45,800     6 5 0.9987
2003-04 10,749     6,026       7,690       46,000     7 5 0.9985
2004-05 11,351     6,090       7,000       43,600     6 5 0.9992
2005-06 12,031     6,258       6,710       41,800     6 6 0.9996
2006-07 12,432     6,479       6,470       40,400     6 6 0.9995
2007-08 12,958     6,775       6,190       40,500     6 6 0.9995
2009-10 13,542     7,644       6,190       39,000     5 6 0.9995
2010-11 13,548     7,548       6,070       38,400     5 6 0.9996
2011-12 13,846     8,333       5,970       38,000     4 7 0.9997
2012-13 13,861     9,000       5,610       36,200     4 7 0.9997
2013-14 13,930     9,906       5,740       32,600     3 7 0.9997
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Table S2. Fitting parameters for the data in Fig. 2. ISO 3166-1 alpha-3 codes are used as the 
country codes. The θ and µ-values are given in EUR. xmin and xmax, respectively, show the 
minimum and maximum income values for each country in EUR used in the statistical fit. % 
below xmin and % above xmax, respectively, show the percentage of the population sample below 
xmin and above xmax. Radj2 are the coefficients of determination for the fits. The last column 
contains exchange rates from LCU to EUR. The data used reports disposable annual household 
income equivalized according to the modified-OECD scale. All countries’ data are for 2014, 
with the exception of Turkey, for which 2012 data was the most current available.	
 
 
 
Country Code θ µ	 x x 	 %	<	x %	>	x 	 R  LCU/EURAustria AUT 13,173			 10,147			 12,393			 77,527			 10 1 0.992 1Belgium BEL 10,570			 10,178			 11,354			 64,128			 10 1 0.987 1Bulgaria BGR 2,728						 882									 1,276						 14,346			 10 1 0.993 1.95702Croatia HRV 3,082						 2,002						 2,278						 16,898			 10 1 0.995 7.575604Cyprus CYP 11,829			 5,477						 5,628						 56,541			 3 2 0.988 1Czech	RepublicCZE 4,403						 3,677						 3,777						 25,948			 5 1 0.988 25.98018Denmark DNK 14,858			 11,620			 11,781			 89,144			 5 1 0.985 7.456595Estonia EST 6,309						 2,093						 2,131						 32,128			 4 1 0.998 1Finland FIN 12,295			 11,569			 13,368			 74,520			 10 1 0.989 1France FRA 13,950			 9,190						 9,278						 68,570			 4 2 0.989 1Germany DEU 12,425			 7,288						 7,580						 70,646			 5 1 0.990 1Greece GRC 5,771						 2,163						 3,000						 32,633			 10 1 0.980 1Hungary HUN 2,830						 1,893						 2,315						 16,261			 10 1 0.991 296.8946Iceland ISL 10,140			 12,042			 12,111			 63,103			 5 1 0.990 162.378Ireland IRL 14,353			 7,093						 7,765						 78,783			 4 1 0.990 1Italy ITA 11,223			 4,464						 6,864						 62,775			 10 1 0.987 1Latvia LVA 4,500						 1,443						 1,557						 23,297			 5 1 0.997 1Lithuania LTU 4,477						 1,311						 1,520						 23,476			 4 1 0.991 3.45189LuxembourgLUX 19,627			 15,385			 18,167			 112,232	 10 1 0.995 1MacedoniaMKD 1,450						 558									 689									 7,569						 10 1 0.996 76Malta MLT 7,364						 5,996						 6,728						 41,930			 10 1 0.997 1NetherlandsNLD 11,232			 9,771						 10,051			 66,190			 5 1 0.993 1Norway NOR 18,668			 20,908			 25,527			 118,483	 10 1 0.991 7.806466Poland POL 3,728						 2,001						 2,038						 20,633			 5 1 0.993 4.197272Portugal PRT 6,823						 2,428						 2,514						 35,553			 5 1 0.996 1Romania ROU 1,423						 682									 742									 7,276						 10 1 0.989 4.429688Serbia SRB 1,969						 536									 712									 10,206			 10 1 0.996 112.963Slovakia SVK 3,381						 3,010						 3,685						 20,566			 10 1 0.992 1Slovenia SVN 5,612						 5,697						 6,157						 33,721			 10 1 0.992 1Spain ESP 9,862						 3,806						 5,098						 52,593			 10 1 0.996 1Sweden SWE 12,341			 11,909			 14,217			 76,208			 10 1 0.988 8.651489SwitzerlandCHE 24,014			 16,718			 20,518			 118,006	 10 2 0.995 1.231088Turkey TUR 8,732						 1,282						 1,400						 34,122			 3 2 0.990 2.337995United	KingdomGBR 14,286			 7,942						 8,166						 79,048			 5 1 0.993 0.806064
35	
	
 
 
 
Table S3. Fitting parameters for the data in Fig. 3. ISO 3166-1 alpha-3 codes are used as the 
three-letter country abbreviations. θ and µ are given in United States dollars (USD). xmin and xmax, 
respectively, show the minimum and maximum income values for each country in USD used in 
the statistical fit. % below xmin and % above xmax, respectively, show the percentage of the 
population below xmin and above xmax. Radj2 are the coefficients of determination for the fits. 
Exchange rates from LCU to USD are given in the last column. As the data are obtained from 
various sources, there are differences in the methodologies of data collection. Some data sources 
report income values that are equivalized, while others report gross household income, while 
others still do not specify. Some sources report annual income, others monthly, and one weekly. 
All numerical values are therefore rescaled to show annual values. 
 
 
 
C ountry C ode Year θ	 µ	 xmin xmax % 	< 	xmin% 	> 	xmax R adj
2 LC U/US D
Argentina ARG 2013 3,687  1,056  836 4348 20   10   0.9960 5.46
Australia AUS 2012 74,244 14,201 299 4999 3    4    0.9946 0.97
Bangladesh BGD 2010 1,457  111    2000 17500 5    16   0.9977 69
Belize BLZ 1999 928    135    24 371 10   10   0.9963 1.98
Bolivia BOL 2012 1,344  209    282 1921 20   10   0.9949 6.96
Brazil BRA 2012 3,601  440    85 1457 10   10   0.9962 2.01
Canada CAN 2012 37,546 2,793  5000 150000 7    2    0.9965 1.02
Chile CHL 2011 3,823  818    42308 385052 10   10   0.9941 468.50
China CHN 2013 6,957  1,967  13000 189596 8    2    0.9966 6.14
Colombia COL 2012 2,245  217    53848 801705 10   10   0.9990 1780.00
Costa Rica CRI 2012 3,917  599    34957 400274 10   10   0.9975 492.55
Dominican RepublicDOM 2011 1,538  384    2396 12518 20   10   0.9999 37.95
Ecuador ECU 2012 1,517  344    58 324 20   10   0.9991 1.00
Egypt EGY 2012 3,303  1,404  9000 75000 3    3    0.9852 6.04
El Salvador SLV 2012 1,039  407    53 236 20   10   0.9983 1.00
Haiti HTI 2001 179    0      38 581 10   20   0.9972 23.50
Honduras HND 2011 1,124  46     757 4220 30   10   0.9983 18.90
Hong Kong HKG 2011 26,635 623    2000 59999 2    4    0.9736 7.78
Liberia LBR 2014 2,029  285    3500 30000 9    17   0.9900 90
Mexico MEX 2012 1,753  377    461 4906 10   10   0.9966 13.35
Micronesia FSM 2005 10,146 403    2500 19999 6    17   0.9983 1
Namibia NAM 2009 4,004  1,279  15701 51311 10   30   0.9915 7.708
Nepal NPL 2006 475    228    2064 7954 20   10   0.9854 73.50
Paraguay PRY 2011 2,138  293    119143 1700749 10   10   0.9973 3950.00
Peru PER 2012 1,910  448    184 1075 20   10   0.9954 2.66
Russia RUS 2006 3,348  857    2500 12000 8    27   0.9973 26.86
Singapore SGP 2014 81,540 3,783  1000 19999 12   10   0.9955 1.25
South Korea KOR 2014 15,419 9,045  1065687 3834176 20   10   0.9845 1011.74
Sri Lanka LKA 2012 2,756  688    10750 57499 10   20   0.9972 131.9
Thailand THA 2013 1,732  400    2481 12608 25   8    0.9977 30.67
United States of AmericaUSA 2014 66,526 5,693  15000 199999 13   6    0.9997 1.00
Uruguay URY 2012 4,628  1,343  2297 19903 10   10   0.9936 20.45
Venezuela VEN 2006 1,177  327    106889 549483 20   10   0.9975 2150.00
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Table S4. Testing results for the data in Fig. 4. Datasets are composed of 26 European 
countries in 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2014, and the details of the data are given in Table S4a. 𝜇 
(MLCR) and adjusted unemployment compensation (UC) are given in EUR. Annual average 
exchange rates in the last column of the four separate years are from LCU to EUR. The 
regression results are shown in Table S4b. The dependent Variable is MLCR, while the 
independent variable is UC. All parameters are estimated by OLS regression. Standard errors and 
the 𝑝-values are reported. Pearson correlation coefficient and the corresponding test statistics, as 
well as the 𝑝-values are also reported.	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Table S4a
2011 2012 2013 2014
Country Code µ uc adj uc LCU/EUR µ uc adj uc LCU/EUR µ uc ad uc LCU/EUR µ uc adj uc LCU/EUR
Austria AUT 9011.558 14507 14507 1 8996.557 14791 14791 1 9089.328 15136 15136 1 10147 15400 15400 1
Belgium BEL 9376.624 16205 16205 1 9161.577 17069 17069 1 10234.03 17759 17759 1 10178 17759 17759 1
Estonia EST 2048.152 5184 5184 1 2121.868 5502 5502 1 2274.793 5866 5866 1 2093.1 6169 6169 1
Finland FIN 10778.19 19204 19204 1 10981.69 21636 21636 1 11599.92 22230 22151 1 11569 28694 28694 1
France FRA 8456.686 20375 20375 1 8884.214 20821 20821 1 9157.157 21147 21128 1 9189.8 21265 21265 1
Germany DEU 8391.587 15418 15418 1 8721.566 15745 15745 1 8156.623 15927 15927 1 7288.1 16272 16272 1
Greece GRC 3247.839 5538 5538 1 2638.16 4320 4320 1 2257.006 4320 4320 1 2162.9 4320 4320 1
Ireland IRL 7575.375 9776 9776 1 7527.011 9776 9776 1 7884 9776 9776 1 7093.2 9776 9776 1
Italy ITA 4805.254 12879 12879 1 4848.9 13432 13432 1 4466.387 13835 13835 1 4463.8 13987 13987 1
Luxembourg LUX 15500.1 40539 40539 1 15508.71 41577 41577 1 14383.48 42904 42788 1 15385 43936 43936 1
Netherlands NLD 9865.709 34715 34715 1 10137.4 35447 35447 1 10127.2 36145 36316 1 9771.2 36866 36866 1
Portugal PRT 2814.132 9327 9327 1 2872.246 9869 9869 1 2447.702 9605 9600 1 2447.702 9502 9502 1
Slovakia SVK 2956.663 4796 4796 1 3273.747 4905 4905 1 3170.945 5001 5001 1 3009.8 5211 5211 1
Slovenia SVN 6008.357 12600 12600 1 6097.567 10710 10710 1 5712.463 10710 10710 1 5696.8 10710 10710 1
Spain ESP 4308.515 13046 13046 1 4180.357 13046 13046 1 4049.05 13046 13046 1 3805.9 13046 13046 1
Switzerland CHE 13434.86 60413 60413 1 16490.72 62555 62555 1 18100.38 62820 62820 1 16718.04 62845 62845 1
Czech Republic CZE 3621.717 147604 6002.603 24.59 3782.041 151621 6028.908 25.149 3762.014 151338 5825.17 25.98 3762.014 154392 5606.915 27.536
Denmark DNK 11871.48 199160 26730.73 7.4506 11579.3 204880 27523.95 7.4437 11794.5 208260 27924.75 7.4579 11620.16 211900 28424.64 7.4548
Hungary HUN 2098.396 1123200 4020.475 279.37 2091.778 1116000 3858.254 289.25 1924.246 1176000 3961.33 296.87 1893.005 1218000 3945.45 308.71
Iceland ISL 9243.455 3055632 18929.7 161.42 9542.277 3162576 19676.33 160.73 10422.34 3265356 20109.35 162.38 12041.6 3382908 21844.94 154.86
Norway NOR 17882.47 296585 38055.92 7.7934 19881.49 307465 41131.89 7.4751 21277.73 319157 40882.45 7.8067 20908.06 330857 39602.72 8.3544
Poland POL 1846.015 10964 2660.778 4.1206 1959.266 11436 2732.812 4.1847 1957.554 11860 2825.49 4.1975 2001.138 11968 2860.216 4.1843
Sweden SWE 10650.67 176800 19579.61 9.0298 11094.92 176800 20312.27 8.7041 11893.51 176800 20435.76 8.6515 11909.15 176800 19431.77 9.0985
Bulgaria BGR 897.6374 5084 2599.45 1.9558 828.8408 5387 2754.372 1.9558 828.534 5686 2907.25 1.9558 882.0043 5962 3048.369 1.9558
Latvia LVA 1137.606 3631 5140.875 0.7063 1213.032 3793 5439.553 0.6973 1377.336 3922 5590.88 0.7015 1442.8 5898 8392.098 0.702804
Lithuania LTU 1511.149 7800 2259.036 3.4528 1599.284 7800 2259.036 3.4528 1413.012 7800 2259.036 3.4528 1310.578 7800 2259.036 3.4528
Table S4b
2011 2012 2013 2014
Dependent Variable: µ Dependent Variable: µ Dependent Variable: µ Dependent Variable: µ
Method: Least Squares Method: Least Squares Method: Least Squares Method: Least Squares
Sample: 1 26 Sample: 1 26 Sample: 1 26 Sample: 1 26
Included observations: 26 Included observations: 26 Included observations: 26 Included observations: 26
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
UC 0.29044 0.034564 8.40292 0 UC 0.315257 0.030481 10.34264 0 UC 0.330724 0.032919 10.04648 0 UC 0.32045 0.035267 9.086325 0
C 2200.382 734.8736 2.994233 0.0063 C 1905.156 672.0609 2.834797 0.0092 C 1715.632 734.6524 2.335297 0.0282 C 1700.435 802.2287 2.119638 0.0446
R-squared 0.746325 R-squared 0.816752 R-squared 0.807895 R-squared 0.774778
Adjusted R-squared0.735755 Adjusted R-squared0.809117 Adjusted R-squared0.799891 Adjusted R-squared0.765393
t-Statistic Prob. t-Statistic Prob. t-Statistic Prob. t-Statistic Prob.
8.40292 0 10.34264 0 10.04648 0 9.086325 0
Pearson Correlation Coefficient Pearson Correlation Coefficient Pearson Correlation Coefficient Pearson Correlation Coefficient
0.863901 0.903743 0.89883 0.880214
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